The recent collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria marks a pivotal moment, evoking celebrations among citizens and questioning the influence of Islamist factions like HTS. Initially based on social welfare, Assad’s government grew increasingly repressive and corrupt. The mixed reactions from various communities lead to uncertainty regarding the future of governance in Syria post-Assad, emphasizing the need for careful navigation through the aftermath of the regime’s downfall.
This week, millions of Syrians are celebrating the downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s oppressive rule. The shocking advances by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the decline of Assad’s control have raised critical questions regarding HTS’s ideology and what the future holds for Syria’s diverse communities. Journalist Anand Gopal discusses these issues, including the origins of the Syrian revolution and the current state of the nation.
The roots of the Syrian regime can be traced back to the 1960s Baath Party coup, which implemented land reforms that garnered support from the peasantry. Following Hafez al-Assad’s rise to power in 1970, a partnership was formed between the Alawite security forces and the Sunni bourgeoisie while welfare services were provided to the poor. This arrangement, however, demanded absolute political submission, leading to severe oppression and a pervasive culture of fear.
Bashar al-Assad’s ascent in 2000 marked the beginning of a fraying system. His adoption of neoliberal reforms dismantled social protections without establishing political freedoms, which resulted in widespread discontent. This disillusionment ultimately sparked the 2011 uprising, characterized by peaceful protests of working- and middle-class citizens, all of whom were striving for political rights and economic security.
As the regime’s violent repression of dissent escalated, protestors armed themselves and formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in defense. The Assad government responded with brutal force, utilizing both deadly assaults on demonstrators and horrifying tactics against civilians throughout the conflict. Assad’s regime, with its long history of brutal suppression, relied on foreign support to maintain its power amid a transforming opposition landscape.
Initially, the supporters of Assad were largely Alawites and Sunni elites from major cities. However, as the conflict intensified, the regime exploited minority fears, convincing many communities they faced annihilation without Assad’s leadership. The ensuing years saw A surge in Islamist factions among the opposition, challenging the secular factions and gaining traction primarily through their organizational effectiveness and focus on addressing community needs.
Assad’s regime has historically neutralized leftist movements, complicating the emergence of a strong socialist presence among the rebels. The uprising featured two distinct groups: the majority working-class advocates for broad reform and a smaller, upper-class, politically focused faction. This division left the secular rebels vulnerable, as they lacked compelling socioeconomic narratives and succumbed to corruption.
The recent loss of support for Assad can be attributed to his regime’s underlying weaknesses, heightened by failed military interventions and crippling economic sanctions. As foreign assistance waned and the local economy deteriorated, public morale crumbled. With disillusionment festering among Assad’s base, support dwindled to mere fear rather than loyalty, culminating in the regime’s collapse when faced with coordinated uprisings from the opposition.
The upheaval in Syria signals a transformative moment after decades of oppressive dictatorship under Assad. Although prospects for a cohesive governance model remain uncertain, there is potential for improved conditions following Assad’s downfall. The Syrian population, having endured immense suffering, may finally be on the path to reclaiming their political agency and pursuing a more democratic future. Nevertheless, significant challenges persist as various factions vie for control in the post-Assad landscape.
Original Source: jacobin.com
